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Review-Essay: Religion and Enlightenment
Simon Grote
David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews,
and Catholics from London to Vienna (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
Jeffrey D. Burson, The Rise and Fall of Theological Enlighten-
ment: Jean-Martin de Prades and Ideological Polarization in
Eighteenth-Century France (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2010).
Ulrich Lehner, Enlightened Monks: The German Benedictines
1740–1803 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Thomas Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlight-
enment: Faith and the Reform of Learning in the Thought of
Christian Thomasius (Rochester: University of Rochester
Press, 2006).
In the decade since 2003, when a special issue of the American Historical
Review heralded the return of religion to Enlightenment studies,1 the steady
stream of books and articles restoring religion to the Enlightenment—
1 Esp. Jonathan Sheehan, ‘‘Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A
Review Essay,’’ American Historical Review 108 (2003): 1061–80.
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alongside a parallel stream of review articles, conferences, and conference
panels—has continued unabated.2
A definitive history of this historiography’s recent rise to prominence
has yet to be written, but from the lofty perspective suggested by the gen-
eral enterprise’s very terms—‘‘restoring religion to the Enlightenment’’—
the multiplicity of its many authors’ individual arguments and purposes
resolves into some basic shapes and trends that suggest a now familiar
story. The Enlightenment, this story goes, has long been regarded as a
moment in which the Western world took significant steps toward moder-
nity, steps that involved the diminution of something commonly identified
as religion. These steps include the rise of theoretical defenses of religious
toleration and separation of church and state as a means of limiting the
state’s power to enforce religious observance, the rise of atheism and the
diminishment of respect for revealed religion under the onslaught of bibli-
cal criticism and philosophical skepticism, and the emergence of powerful
critiques of the spiritual and political prerogatives of the clergy, to take
but a few examples. This type of modernization narrative is old but resil-
ient. One of its best-known exponents, Peter Gay, retains his canonical
aura and remains a point of departure for critics and admirers alike,3 and
newer exponents of similar narratives abound. The Enlightenment has
been described in recent years as witness to the liberation of humanity
from divine-command theories of moral obligation4; the demise of the
2 E.g. Ritchie Robertson, ‘‘Religion and Enlightenment: A Review Essay,’’ German His-
tory 25 (2007): 422–31; Jeremy Gregory, ‘‘Introduction: Transforming ‘the Age of Rea-
son’ into ‘an Age of Faiths’: Or, Putting Religions and Beliefs (Back) into the Eighteenth
Century,’’ Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 32 (2009): 287–305; Aufkla¨rung 21
(2009), ‘‘Themenschwerpunkt: Religion,’’ ed. Robert Theis; Michael Hofmann and Cars-
ten Zelle, eds., Aufkla¨rung und Religion: Neue Perspektiven (Erlangen: Wehrhahn,
2010); Charly Coleman, ‘‘Resacralizing the World: The Fate of Secularization in Enlight-
enment Historiography,’’ Journal of Modern History 82 (2010): 368–95; ‘‘New
Approaches to Religious and Radical Enlightenments,’’ panel organized by Jeffrey Bur-
son, 13th International Congress for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Graz, Austria, July 28,
2011; ‘‘God and the Enlightenment,’’ conference at the George Washington Forum at
Ohio University, October 4–6, 2012.
3 As measured by, for example, his inclusion in Ryan Patrick Hanley and Darrin M.
McMahon, eds., The Enlightenment, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2010). Cf. Dan Edel-
stein’s admiring treatment in The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2010), 4–5; and, as an example of a recent textbook that takes many
cues from Gay, Ronald S. Love, The Enlightenment (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
2008).
4 J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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Christian church’s cultural authority and of theology’s long-lived domin-
ion over the other sciences5; and the emergence of modernity within an
intellectual underground inhabited by atheists, radicals, freethinkers,
Spinozists, and other opponents of the established churches.6
Over the past several decades, explicit or implicit attempts to push
back against narratives like these have taken a variety of approaches. One
has been to point out the various ways in which religion remained impor-
tant through the eighteenth century and beyond.7 It continued to function
as a principle of social cohesion and political legitimation with a major role
to play in politics, culture, and people’s everyday lives,8 and the Bible in
particular retained its authority even as withering denials that it contained
the word of God prompted German Protestant theologians to refashion it
into a pillar of Western culture.9
Another approach has been to stipulate the term enlightened religion
or religious Enlightenment, largely in conformity with older histories of
eighteenth-century Christian theology, to refer to theologians and theolo-
gies characterized by, among other things, respect for natural science; antip-
athy toward creeds; alertness to the dangers of fanaticism and superstition;
promotion of religious toleration; and confidence that revealed truths, to
5 Louis Dupre´, Religion and the Rise of Modern Culture (Notre Dame, Ind.: University
of Notre Dame Press, 2008), esp. 2. Cf. Mark Somos, Secularisation and the Leiden
Circle (Leiden: Brill, 2011), which sets the gradual ‘‘removal of Christian theology from
all aspects of thought’’ (4) primarily in an earlier and different intellectual context.
6 E.g. Margaret C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons, and
Republicans (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), and ‘‘The Enlightenment Critique of Chris-
tianity,’’ in The Cambridge History of Christianity, vol. 7, Enlightenment, Reawakening
and Revolution, 1660–1815, ed. Stewart J. Brown and Timothy Tackett (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 265–82; Martin Mulsow, Moderne aus dem Unter-
grund: Radikale Fru¨haufkla¨rung in Deutschland, 1680–1720 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2002);
and Jonathan Israel (see below, n. 27). On the similar conjecture of Christianity’s
demise at the hands of esotericism—though with the caveat that defining esotericism
in opposition to rationality produces affinities with antimodern secularization theories—
see Monica Neugebauer-Wo¨lk, ‘‘Einleitung,’’ Aufkla¨rung und Esoterik: Wege in die
Moderne, ed. Neugebauer-Wo¨lk and Holger Zaunsto¨ck (Hamburg: Meiner, 1999), esp.
6–7.
7 Dieter Breuer, ‘‘Einleitung,’’ Religion und Religiosita¨t im Zeitalter des Barock, ed.
Breuer (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1995), xvii-xviii; Knud Haakonssen, ‘‘Enlightened Dis-
sent: An Introduction,’’ in Religion and Enlightenment: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-
Century Britain, ed. Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2–3.
8 E.g. J. C. D. Clark, English Society, 1688–1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics During
the Ancien Re´gime, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
9 Jonathan Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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the extent that they are not superfluous, do not contradict truths discover-
able by human reason examining the natural world.10 This approach reso-
nates with the religious connotations of Aufkla¨rung’s eighteenth-century
usage.11
Still another approach has been to demonstrate that something essen-
tial to the Enlightenment, something categorizable as secular and modern,
in fact had roots in something religious. Max Weber’s well-known thesis
about the origins of a capitalist mentality in Calvinist asceticism, one of
many ‘‘secularization theses’’ famously criticized by Hans Blumenberg for
the tendentiousness of their antimodern rhetoric, is a paradigmatic exam-
ple.12 More recent searches for the religious roots of modernity, usually less
obviously antimodern in their rhetoric and less emphatic about the persis-
tence of the religious within the modern, have produced a plethora of other
candidates. French Jansenism is one favorite. Its ecclesiology and political
theory have been identified as sources for arguments within the 1789
French National Assembly in favor of secularizing church property13; its
account of God as distant and inscrutable has been invoked to explain the
emergence of the concept of an autonomous secular realm and, by exten-
sion, the rise of French nationalism14; and its Augustinian view of human
10 E.g. David Sorkin, The Berlin Haskalah and German Religious Thought: Orphans of
Knowledge (Portland: Valentine Mitchell, 2000); and, drawing partly on Sorkin, Helena
Rosenblatt, ‘‘The Christian Enlightenment,’’ in Brown and Tackett, eds., Enlightenment,
Reawakening and Revolution, 283–301. Cf. Albrecht Beutel, Aufkla¨rung in Deutschland,
vol. 4 of Die Kirche in ihrer Geschichte, ed. B. Moeller (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2006); Emanuel Hirsch, Die deutsche christliche Aufkla¨rung im Zeitalter Sem-
lers und Lessings (Gutersloh: Bertelsman, 1949); Karl Heussi, Kompendium der Kir-
chengeschichte, 11th ed. (Tu¨bingen: Mohr, 1956), §§104–11; and, still fundamental, Karl
Aner, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929).
11 E.g. Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s 1784 account of Aufkla¨rung as the education of the
masses, including in religious matters, by philosophers: ‘‘Thoughts on Enlightenment,’’
trans. Kevin Paul Geiman, in What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and
Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), 65–77.
12 Hans Blumenberg, ‘‘ ‘Sa¨kularisation’: Kritik einer Kategorie historischer Illegitimita¨t,’’
in Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem Fortschritt, ed. Helmut Kuhn and Franz
Wiedman (Munich: Anton Pustet, 1964), 240–65; and on Blumenberg and Weber, Daniel
Weidner, ‘‘The Rhetoric of Secularization,’’ New German Critique (forthcoming). My
thanks to Daniel Weidner and David Martin for these references.
13 Dale Van Kley, The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the
Civil Constitution, 1560–1791 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 354–58 et
passim. On this paradigmatic use of the term secularization, cf. Blumenberg, ‘‘ ‘Sa¨kularisa-
tion,’ ’’ 240–41.
14 David Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), esp. chap. 1; and, on Jansenism’s
‘‘resacralizing’’ as well as secularizing effects, Charly Coleman, ‘‘Resacralizing the World.’’
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nature as ineradicably selfish has been identified as a quasi-Epicurean pre-
supposition underlying much of Enlightenment political-economic theory.15
Other searches have led to a variety of anti-Augustinianisms. These include
Arminians and Socinians, whose rejection of a repressive orthodox Calvin-
ism in most of Western Europe paved the way for the ‘‘intellectual prog-
ress’’ of the eighteenth century16; Latitudinarians and other Anglicans,
whose ‘‘moral religion’’ begat the areligious ethical debates characteristic
of the Scottish Enlightenment17; and, most recently, the ‘‘federal theology’’
of Reformed theologian Johannes Coccejus (1603–69), which introduced
late seventeenth-century Calvinism and Lutheranism to the possibility of
human beings’ progressive moral improvement, thereby undermining long-
standing notions of original sin.18
Any new contribution to this discussion faces a problem that has long
threatened the discussion’s very coherence: the basic problem of how to
define the central terms Enlightenment and religion, about which there is
understandably no general consensus. The much-discussed difficulty of
defining Enlightenment begins, of course, with the fact that the word can
denote either a period of time or something in or about that period of time.
The benefit of the former usage—to academic publishers, for example—is
obvious: it can add an instant luster of modernity and relevance to anything
15 John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680–1760
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), e.g. 127–30. Cf. Istvan Hont, The Jeal-
ousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 47–51; and Dale van Kley, ‘‘Pierre
Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest,’’ in Anticipations of the
Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany, ed. Alan Charles Kors and Paul J.
Korshin (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 69–85.
16 Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘‘The Religious Origins of the Enlightenment,’’ in The European
Witch Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, by Trevor-Roper (New York:
Harper, 1968), 193–236, a right-leaning pendant to Christopher Hill’s portrayal of mid-
seventeenth-century Puritans as authors of an ‘‘intellectual revolution’’ in Intellectual
Origins of the Puritan Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965). On still earlier examples
of a similar view, i.e. Adolf von Harnack and earlier Hegelian histories of theology, see
Martin Mulsow and Jan Rohls, preface to Socinianism and Arminianism: Antitrinitari-
ans, Calvinists and Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Europe, ed. Mulsow and
Rohls (Leiden: Brill, 2005), vii–viii.
17 Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion
and Ethics in England, 1660–1780, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991–2000).
18 Anselm Schubert, Das Ende der Su¨nde: Anthropologie und Erbsu¨nde zwischen Refor-
mation und Aufkla¨rung (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002); and, leaning on
Schubert to explain the origins of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, Stefan Borchers,
Die Erzeugung des ‘‘ganzen Menschen’’: Zur Entstehung von Anthropologie und
A¨sthetik an der Universita¨t Halle im 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011).
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and everything in the eighteenth century and some part of the later seven-
teenth. But only the latter usage can justify this epoch’s chronological
boundaries and provide a touchstone for telling true luster from false. Here
the difficulty increases. If Enlightenment denotes something in or about an
epoch, then it must be either something intuitively identifiable or something
that can be defined. Each path is full of pitfalls. On the one hand, those
who identify Enlightenment intuitively, without defining it, can easily end
up talking at cross-purposes.19 On the other hand, our intuitions about the
Enlightenment have been so deeply ingrained by the weight of a vast and
variegated scholarship, casual usage, and partiality to mutually inconsistent
visions of modernity that it has become extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to stipulate any usably specific definition of Enlightenment that does
not exclude something already commonly assumed to belong to it. Enlight-
enment in National Context, one of the most influential collections of
essays on the Enlightenment in the past three decades, illustrates this prob-
lem. It represented a repudiation of the long-standing tendency to take
France as the model of Enlightenment per se, and accordingly to define
Enlightenment as anticlericalism, atheism, opposition to monarchy, and
many other things that did not dominate the intellectual landscape in places
such as Germany and Scotland, where—as had become intuitively obvi-
ous—there was also an Enlightenment.20 The book’s impact testifies to the
power of such intuitive obviousness, whatever its sources,21 to destabilize
even deeply entrenched definitions.
To this problem of settling on a single, usable definition of Enlighten-
ment, a variety of solutions has been proposed, all of which face problems
of their own. One common solution is to define Enlightenment as an aggre-
gate of general qualities—mostly descriptors of certain highly educated
19 A classic example of this danger can be found in Roy Porter and Mikula´s Teich, eds.,
The Enlightenment in National Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
where in separate essays, Christian Wolff’s influence is portrayed unhesitatingly as both
a sign of the Enlightenment’s impact in the Holy Roman Empire (T. C. W. Blanning) and
an impediment to its impact in Sweden (Tore Frangsmyr).
20 Porter and Teich, eds., Enlightenment in National Context, vii. Cf. Zelle, ‘‘Einleitung,’’
in Hofmann and Zelle, eds., Aufkla¨rung und Religion, 7.
21 Conjectures about possible sources of this obviousness—in nationalism and geopolitics,
and in the desire to restore religion to the Enlightenment, respectively—can be found in
Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2010), 20–21; and Sheehan, ‘‘Enlightenment,’’ 1066–67. Another source, i.e. antipathy
to 1980s postmodernist and other caricatures of the Enlightenment, can perhaps be
inferred from David Hollinger, ‘‘The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Con-
flict in the United States,’’ in What’s Left of Enlightenment? A Postmodern Question, ed.
Keith Michael Baker and Peter Hanns Reill (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001),
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people’s ideals, worldviews, preoccupations, and reform programs—that
transcend national particularities: rationality, toleration, humanitarianism,
utilitarianism, and so on.22 Among the obstacles to accepting this kind of
solution is the difficulty of finding such qualities as a complete aggregate in
most places where Enlightenment is assumed to have been, and the fact that
many individual qualities present definitional puzzles of their own, espe-
cially if their definitions are supposed to warrant drawing the Enlighten-
ment’s chronological boundaries around the eighteenth century.23
Another solution has been to define Enlightenment in terms of practical
modes of communication: the emergence of salons, newspapers, coffee-
houses, masonic lodges, the public sphere, the literary public, and a general
culture of sociability; the expansion and creation of networks of schol-
arly communication; the emergence of eclectically assembled and non-
hierarchically structured texts; and the development of non-dogmatic
argumentative structures in learned debate, for example.24 Those who are
uncomfortable with a definition of Enlightenment that excludes ideas may
insist that new modes of communication be attached to a more extensive
aggregate definition, but there remains the obstacle that many intuitively
Enlightenment ideas (such as those that appeared primarily in systemati-
cally arranged university textbooks) continued to be communicated by old
means.25
A third type of solution has been to define Enlightenment as the conse-
quence of a single cause, of which recent proposals include the emergence
of an internationally influential modernization narrative out of the quarrel
of the ancients and the moderns in late seventeenth-century France,26 a
post-1680 ‘‘convergence between Augustinian and Epicurean currents of
22 E.g. Mikula´s Teich, ‘‘Afterword,’’ in Porter and Mikula´s Teich, eds., Enlightenment in
National Context, 216.
23 One attempt to overcome these obstacles—namely by defining Enlightenment not as an
aggregate of ideals but as a newly vigorous engagement with the single, extremely general
question of ‘‘the relationship between spirit [Geist] and sensibility [Sinnlichkeit]’’—can be
found in Panajotis Kondylis, Die Aufkla¨rung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), esp. 19–21.
24 E.g. Sheehan, ‘‘Enlightenment,‘‘ 1075–79; Carla Hesse, ‘‘Towards a New Topography
of Enlightenment,’’ European Review of History 13 (2006): 499–508; Robertson, Case
for the Enlightenment, 16–21; James Van HornMelton, The Rise of the Public in Enlight-
enment Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Martin Gierl,
Pietismus und Aufkla¨rung: Theologische Polemik und der Kommunikationswandel der
Gelehrsamkeit am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1997), among many others.
25 Cf. Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment, 5; Hesse,
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thinking about the nature of man and the possibility of society’’ that pro-
duced in the 1740s a ‘‘new focus on betterment in this world,’’27 and the
international dissemination of the ideas of Benedict Spinoza.28 The useful-
ness of these proposals depends in large part on whether a sufficiently broad
and intuitively Enlightenment-resembling set of consequences can be traced
convincingly to the proposed cause. In the case of the last proposal, ad-
vanced with stunning comprehensiveness by Jonathan Israel, the jury is still
out. Israel conceptually divides Enlightenment thinkers into two categories,
radical and moderate, each of which articulated its ideas in response to the
dissemination of a systematically coherent set of philosophical positions
articulated by Spinoza: a monistic metaphysics that ruled out teleology,
miracles, providence, revelation, and the immortality of the soul; a denial
that moral principles have divine origins; a rejection of ecclesiastical
authority; a denial that social hierarchy, noble privilege, and monarchical
power are ordained by God; and robust support for freedom of thought
and for political egalitarianism.29 The radical Enlighteners, modernity’s
standard-bearers, defended a democratic and revolutionary ideology—a
‘‘package of basic human rights’’—that derived from Spinoza’s ideas and
that ultimately bore responsibility for the French Revolution’s outbreak
and inspired its loftiest ideals.30 By contrast, the moderate Enlighteners,
also reformers in their own ways, responded to what they perceived as the
danger of Spinozistic radicalism by attempting—and ultimately failing,
because of the comparative incoherence of their more conservative ideol-
ogy—to ‘‘restore stable and enduring structures of authority, legitimacy,
knowledge, and faith.’’31 Critics of this already enormously influential
bipartite classification have questioned, broadly speaking, both its compre-
hensiveness (i.e. whether every Enlightenment thinker can really be classi-
fied as a full-fledged radical or a moderate) and the genealogical claim
embedded within it (i.e. whether all instances of radicalism and moderatism
are truly traceable to an encounter with a systematic philosophy that can
be regarded as Spinoza’s own).32
27 Robertson, Case for the Enlightenment, 8–9.
28 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity
1650–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Enlightenment Contested: Philoso-
phy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006); Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights,
1750–1790 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and A Revolution of the Mind:
Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
29 Israel, e.g. Radical Enlightenment, 4, 11–13, 159–62; Democratic Enlightenment, 11.
30 Israel, Democratic Enlightenment, 12.
31 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 9.
32 E.g. Margaret C. Jacob, ‘‘Spinoza Got It,’’ London Review of Books, November 8,
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Finally, there is the solution, proposed famously by J. G. A. Pocock, to
use the term Enlightenment in different ways, depending on the context.
On this account, there can be a Protestant Enlightenment and a Catholic
Enlightenment; German, Scottish, and French Enlightenments; liberal and
conservative Enlightenments; and many more, all of which bear a ‘‘family
resemblance’’ to one another, a` la Wittgenstein’s games, without all having
any single indentifiable thing in common.33 This solution presents an
appealing alternative to an aggregate definition, in so far as it allows the
components to be joined with or rather than and. Instead of rationality and
toleration and new modes of communication, for example, Enlightenment
can mean rationality or toleration or new modes of communication, which
bodes well for those who seek in the Enlightenment the roots of a moder-
nity that encompasses a multitude of differences. But here, too, difficulties
abound. To the extent that this solution allows the search for a definition
to continue, it redirects that search toward the individual Enlightenments,
where our definitional problems are unlikely to diminish. And because in
principle it allows us to say little about Enlightenment per se, it offers virtu-
ally no hope either to those dismayed by the kind of cross-talk that can
result from leaving Enlightenment definitionless, or to those who worry
that as Enlightenments multiply and the family resemblances grow more
and more distant, Enlightenment will grow increasingly empty as a concept,
ultimately serving only to conflate—speciously—people, groups, and ideas
that were in many respects at odds with one another.34
Even what may seem a reasonable fallback position, to define Enlight-
enment as simply ‘‘the new’’ or ‘‘the modern’’ in eighteenth-century
Europe, presents difficulties above and beyond its potentially off-putting
generality. Newness will not suffice on its own: every year ushered in some-
thing new, so defining the Enlightenment in terms of newness presupposes
some other way of deciding where the Enlightenment’s chronological
2012, 26–27; Anthony J. La Vopa, ‘‘A New Intellectual History? Jonathan Israel’s
Enlightenment,’’ Historical Journal 52 (2009): 717–38; Antoine Lilti, ‘‘Comment e´crit-
on l’histoire intellectuelle des Lumie`res? Spinozisme, radicalisme, et philosophie,’’
Annales 64 (2009): 171–206; Simon B. Duffy, ‘‘Spinoza Today: The Current State of
Spinoza Scholarship,’’ Intellectual History Review 19 (2009), 119–20; and Russ Leo,
‘‘Caute: Jonathan Israel’s Secular Modernity,’’ Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory
9 (2008): 76–83. Cf. Edelstein, Enlightenment, 8–9; and, in response to some of these
criticisms, Israel, Democratic Enlightenment, e.g. 2–3, 10–17.
33 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘‘The Re-Description of Enlightenment,’’ Proceedings of the British
Academy 125 (2006): 101–17.
34 Darrin M. McMahon, ‘‘Religious Enlightenment: A Useful Category of Research?’’
(13th International Congress for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Graz, Austria, July 28,
2011); cf. Robertson, Case for the Enlightenment, 16; and Edelstein, Enlightenment, 6.
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boundaries should be. And although the duty to provide cultural self-
knowledge may require historians to search for the roots of modernity,35
defining Enlightenment in terms of modernity begs at least one question
that many historians of the eighteenth century understandably present as
beyond the scope of their research, namely how exactly to connect moder-
nity’s putative eighteenth-century roots to the treetops of modernity itself
in later centuries.
Turning from Enlightenment to religion, we face problems no less frus-
trating. How to define the term, and whether it can and should be defined,
remain subjects of active debate among philosophers, theologians, anthro-
pologists, and other social scientists.36 Enlightenment historians have
tended to take its meaning as intuitively obvious, such that it can be affixed
without comment to a wide range of things, including faith or belief
ungrounded in rational demonstration; a sense or idea of the sacred, the
divine, or the supernatural; belief in miracles; belief in revealed truths;
places and practices of worship; specific members of the clergy; ecclesiasti-
cal offices and institutions; metaphysics; and theology.37 Pragmatically
avoiding explicit and precise definition has, unfortunately, a number of
drawbacks. First, it obscures the fact that religion’s place in the Enlighten-
ment depends as much on religion’s definition as on Enlightenment’s. (If
the essence of religion is a faith or feeling incapable of rational demonstra-
tion, for example, then an Enlightenment defined as fundamentally rational
will have no place for it. If religion is defined in terms of institutions and
offices, on the other hand, then an Enlightenment whose essence is the
emergence of a public sphere will have a place for religion as soon as it can
be shown that members of the clergy participated in that emergence.) Sec-
ond, absent an explicit definition of religion we are left without good tools
for answering questions begged by many discussions of eighteenth-century
religion: whether one view of God can be regarded as more religious than
another, for example, or whether it is more religious to believe that miracles
35 Hollinger, ‘‘Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict,’’ 17.
36 E.g. in Jan G. Platvoet and Arie L. Molendijk, eds., The Pragmatics of Defining Reli-
gion: Contexts, Concepts, and Contests (Leiden: Brill, 1999); and Ernst Feil, ed., On the
Concept of Religion, trans. Brian McNeil (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000). Cf. Hartmut
Lehmann, ‘‘Von der Erforschung der Sa¨kularisierung zur Forschung von Prozessen der
Dechristianisierung und der Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa,’’ in Sa¨kularisier-
ung, Dechristianisierung, Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa: Bilanz und Pers-
pektiven der Forschung, ed. Lehmann (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), 11.
37 The classic list of forty-eight definitions of religion, frequently cited as possible grounds
for abandoning the search for any single definition, can be found in James H. Leuba,
‘‘Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion,‘‘ Monist 11 (1901): 195–225. Molen-
dijk, ‘‘In Defence of Pragmatism,’’ 3.
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violate the natural order than to believe that the inviolability of the natural
order is a sign of divine providence, or whether it is more religious to
expand than to diminish the clergy’s political prerogatives or the political
sovereign’s authority over religious doctrine.
Terminological ambiguities such as these may be inevitable, but at least
one of the dangers they pose is obvious: any discussion of religion and
Enlightenment that places weight on the two terms can easily degenerate
into either a frustrating exercise in equivocation, in which the constantly
shaking definitional ground throws all dialogue off balance, or an unresolv-
able quarrel over the definitions themselves. The inherent ambiguity of even
simple, ubiquitous descriptive statements (e.g. ‘‘The Enlightenment was a
social process as well as an intellectual movement’’), in which it is seldom
obvious whether a definition is being explicitly stipulated or merely tacitly
applied, only heightens the danger.
And yet despair has not become the norm. Notwithstanding the occa-
sional call to jettison one or the other category entirely,38 Enlightenment
remains an irresistible canvas for historians to paint visions of its one con-
stant referent, modernity, with all its positive or negative valences; and reli-
gion, of course, remains embedded in the irresistible question—still alluring
even in its most general formulation—of the extent to which, and the
respects in which, religion can be regarded as modern. This is one of the
fundamental questions addressed by David Sorkin, Jeffrey Burson, and
Ulrich Lehner in their newest books. Their answers, though not identical,
are similar. Each gives modernity a positive valence; each stipulates a famil-
iar constellation of ideas and attitudes for categorization as religious,
enlightened, and modern; and each more or less accepts the bipartite cate-
gorical framework propounded by Jonathan Israel—i.e. radical and moder-
ate—and describes enlightened religion or religious Enlightenment as akin
to Israel’s moderate Enlightenment, while resisting Israel’s placement of
modernity’s mantel so squarely upon the shoulders of the radicals.
David Sorkin presents The Religious Enlightenment as an attempt to
replace the image of a thoroughly secular Enlightenment with an image of
the Enlightenment that can ‘‘complicat[e] our understanding of belief’s crit-
ical and abiding role in modern culture’’ and thereby reveal the religious
roots of political liberalism while teaching us how to narrow the ‘‘seem-
ingly unbridgeable chasms between secularists and believers.’’39 To that
end, Sorkin devotes his book to the recovery of a type of eighteenth-century
38 Molendijk, ‘‘In Defence of Pragmatism,’’ 5.
39 Sorkin, Religious Enlightenment, 1–3, 21, 314.
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religion whose learned proponents, while clearly in the orbit of Jonathan
Israel’s establishment-friendly moderate Enlightenment, have as much
claim to a place in modernity’s genealogy as do Israel’s anticlerical, demo-
cratic radicals. In opposition to the militance, dogmatism, and fanaticism
that had characterized European religions in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries,40 Sorkin explains, they (1) proposed ‘‘reasonable religion’’ as a
‘‘middle way’’ between various extremes; (2) advocated religious toleration
by appealing to principles of natural law; (3) participated eagerly in the
republic of letters and the ‘‘secular aspects of the public sphere’’; and (4)
accepted state authority in civil matters while seeking church autonomy in
matters of faith.41 These were learned, cosmopolitan proto-liberals, close to
the centers of power in their respective parts of Europe, who ‘‘us[ed] the
new science and philosophy to promote a tolerant, irenic understanding of
belief that could serve a shared morality and politics’’ and sustain a ‘‘multi-
confessional polity.’’42
As evidence for this religious Enlightenment’s applicability as a cate-
gory and for its centrality to eighteenth-century European culture, Sorkin
sketches intellectual portraits of six exemplary participants from various
times, places, and religions, drawing attention to the common elements of
their intellectual projects: William Warburton (1698–1779), priest and
learned controversialist in the party of ‘‘Moderation’’ within the Church of
England of the 1730s and ’40s; Jacob Vernet (1698–1789), theologian and
proponent of ‘‘Enlightened orthodox’’ Calvinism in mid-century Geneva;
Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706–57), professor of theology in Halle and
representative of the Wolffian mainstream of mid-century German Luther-
anism; Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), leading representative of enlight-
ened Judaism in the second half of the century in Berlin; Joseph Eybel
(1741–1805), leading exponent of reform Catholicism in the Austrian lands
and architect of Emperor Joseph II’s religious reforms late in the century;
and Adrien Lamourette (1742–94), friend and consultant to Mirabeau and
prominent advocate of ‘‘Christian democracy’’ in the early years of the
French Revolution, whose late and short-lived prominence Sorkin uses to
illustrate the comparative meagerness of France’s religious Enlightenment.
With the partial and brief exception of Lamourette, the subjects of Sor-
kin’s portraits were hardly committed democrats, and the religious tolera-
tion they advocated excluded, among other groups, atheists. For these and
40 Ibid., 5–6, contra e.g. Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the
Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2007).
41 Sorkin, Religious Enlightenment, 11–18.
42 Ibid., 6, 11–19.
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other reasons, it is unclear to what extent they can in fact help us find a
suitable place for religion in modern liberal democracies, and Sorkin does
not press this point hard. Much of the historiographical value of his project,
as of his previous book,43 lies in the attention it draws to common theologi-
cal dynamics within several Christianities and Judaism by explicitly linking
Moses Mendelssohn and the Berlin Haskalah to theologians (e.g. Vernet,
Baumgarten) and concepts (e.g. reasonableness, toleration) central to the
now familiar category of ‘‘Christian Enlightenment.’’44 If, as Sorkin notes,
six intellectual portraits do not compose a comprehensive study of these
common dynamics, they at least suggest ‘‘landmarks’’ and questions that
anyone interested in offering a more comprehensive picture of a religious
Enlightenment needs to consider.45
One of the most general of these questions, of course, is how far Sor-
kin’s model of a religious Enlightenment can be pushed, with respect to its
prevalence in the eighteenth century and its clarity as a category. With
respect to prevalence: precisely how widespread was the constellation of
opinions and attitudes represented by Sorkin’s six authors, and where and
when could it be found as an aggregate? With respect to clarity: how pre-
cisely can religious Enlightenment’s essential features be defined? One of
these features, the advocacy of reasonable religion as a middle way between
two extremes, is in some cases merely a rhetorical trope: one man’s middle
way is often another’s extreme, one man’s reasonableness another’s unrea-
sonableness. Whereas Eybel presented his own Catholicism as a middle
way, for example, Vernet presented Catholicism as an extreme.46 And most
middle ways, like Baumgarten’s hermeneutic theory (‘‘a middle path
between Pietism’s subjective exegesis and Orthodoxy’s inspiration the-
ory’’)47 and Warburton’s theory of justification (a middle way between
Puritan enthusiasm and deist unbelief),48 do not have much in common
simply by virtue of their position between two extremes. But Sorkin often
suggests that behind the rhetorical similarities of his six theologians lay
similarities of substance. Most of their theologies reflected the impact of
Dutch collegialism and Arminianism; made use of natural religion, physico-
theology, and historical-critical defenses of the Bible’s authenticity; re-
garded revelation as above but not contrary to reason; and emphasized
43 Sorkin, Berlin Haskalah.
44 Rosenblatt, ‘‘Christian Enlightenment.’’
45 Sorkin, Religious Enlightenment, xiv.
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the importance of morality and good practice over assent to doctrine.49 A
definitive account of a religious Enlightenment will need to consider how
precisely these similarities of substance can be defined (so as to ensure their
usefulness as analytical categories)50 without diminishing the breadth of
their applicability by revealing that the details were in many cases hotly
contested.51
The more intractable question, not answerable by further research
alone, is whether the boundaries of a religious Enlightenment should be
drawn as Sorkin has drawn them. The answer depends in large part upon
what any given historian wishes to include within Enlightenment’s modern
penumbra, and to what extent he or she is willing, for the sake of avoiding
definitional quarrels, to accept multiple distinct religious Enlightenments,
multiple religious Enlightenments related by ‘‘family resemblance,’’ or a
single, intuitively recognizable but undefined religious Enlightenment.
Some may want to erase support for a centralizing state or even ‘‘reason-
ableness’’ from the list of essential characteristics, so that various kinds of
toleration-seeking Protestant dissenters and ‘‘enthusiasts’’ can find a place
among modernity’s progenitors.52 Others may object to Sorkin’s exclusion
of early eighteenth-century Lutheran Pietists (including Siegmund Jacob
Baumgarten’s teachers) from the religious Enlightenment, pointing to their
interest in new science and mathematics, their historical-critical biblical
scholarship, their visibility in the public sphere, and their alliance with the
modernizing Prussian state.53 Those who take theism to be the essential
characteristic of religion and find anticlericalism inoffensive may want to
find a way of including a variety of deists. Still others may want to include
among religious Enlightenment’s essential characteristics not only opinions
and attitudes but also practices of piety.54
49 Ibid., e.g. 13–15, 32–3, 42–3, 60, 115, 130.
50 On the capacity of excessively general definitions to dissolve the ‘‘historical moorings’’
of their referents, cf. Hans Schneider, German Radical Pietism, trans. Gerald T. McDon-
ald (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2007), 183, criticizing F. E. Stoeffler’s unusually
broad definition of Pietism.
51 Cf. Thomas Ahnert’s resistance to Sorkin’s portrayal of reason in Berlin Haskalah as a
‘‘central and self-evident principle’’ in early Enlightenment Germany, in Religion and the
Origins of the German Enlightenment, 122.
52 As suggested, for example, by contributers to Haakonssen, ed., Enlightenment and
Religion. Cf. Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment, 2–3,
122–23.
53 E.g. Kelly Whitmer, ‘‘Eclecticism and the Technologies of Discernment in Pietist Peda-
gogy,’’ Journal of the History of Ideas 70 (2009), 545–67; and Kelly Whitmer, ‘‘Learning
to See in the Pietist Orphanage: Geometry, Philanthropy and the Science of Perfection,
1695–1730’’ (Ph.D. diss., University of British Columbia, 2008). Cf. Sorkin’s more inclu-
sive treatment of Pietism in Berlin Haskalah, 15.
54 E.g. Ulrich L. Lehner, ‘‘Review of The Religious Enlightenment, by David Sorkin,’’
Journal of Religion 92 (2012): 161.
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Jeffrey Burson’s alternative to the religious Enlightenment sketched by
Sorkin is a less definition-bound, internally more multiplex ‘‘European
Theological Enlightenment.’’55 One part of it is represented in The Rise and
Fall of Theological Enlightenment by a group Sorkin and others pointedly
exclude: Jesuits and their theological allies in early- and mid-century
France. What makes them worthy of inclusion, Burson argues, rather than
the counter-Enlightenment obstacle on the road to modernity that they are
often taken to be,56 is the viability of their apologetic theology—or in Sor-
kin’s vocabulary, the reasonableness of their religion. To advance this argu-
ment, Burson frames his book as a challenge to Jonathan Israel’s critique of
the broader moderate Enlightenment to which Burson assigns the Jesuits.
On Israel’s account, the moderate Enlightenment lost its prestige in France
because its weaknesses as an intellectual system inevitably made it ‘‘unable
to win the intellectual battles’’ of mid-century.57 Burson, by contrast, con-
siders the mid-century decline of the moderate Enlightenment not a case
study in intellectual evolution, in which the fittest ideas survive and their
feeble counterparts justly perish, but rather a tragedy, in which a powerful
and pitiable hero is brought down by forces beyond his control, unwittingly
and unnecessarily stepping into precisely the trap he has been trying to
avoid.58 Burson’s hero is the internally divided Gallican Church—and par-
ticularly the open-minded, philosophically sophisticated, institutionally
well-placed Jesuit theologians of the 1730s and ’40s, who in the 1750s,
under pressure from the anti-Lockean and anti-philosophe polemics of their
Jansenist enemies, foolishly traded a powerful, Locke- and Malebranche-
inspired, moderate-Enlightenment apologetics for a ‘‘still-born’’ counter-
Enlightenment alternative, thereby leaving the Church at the mercy of the
radical, deistic critiques that it had once possessed the intellectual resources
to rebut.59
The critical moment in this extremely complicated story, in Burson’s
55 Burson, Rise and Fall, 7.
56 Burson, Rise and Fall, 9, takes issue not only implicitly with the standard relegation of
the Jesuits to the counter-Enlightenment and exclusion from the Catholic Enlightenment,
but also explicitly with the conflation of Catholic and counter-Enlightenments in Darrin
M. McMahon’s Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and
the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). On opposition to the
Jesuits as a hallmark of Catholic Enlightenment: Michael Printy, Enlightenment and the
Creation of German Catholicism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16;
and Ulrich L. Lehner, ‘‘The Many Faces of the Catholic Enlightenment,’’ in A Companion
to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe, ed. Lehner and Printy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 31.
57 Burson, Rise and Fall, 5, 7–8.
58 Ibid., 102, 136–37, 298–99, 307–9.
59 Ibid., 242–43, 300, et passim.
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view, came in 1752, when the Sorbonne’s Jesuit-dominated theology fac-
ulty decided to censure the dissertation of one of its students, Jean Martin
de Prades (1724–82). The ‘‘Prades Affair,’’ as the scandal surrounding this
decision was known, is the focus of Burson’s book. By means of an elabo-
rate explication and intellectual and institutional contextualization of
Prades’s dissertation, Burson argues that far from being the mouthpiece of
an isolated group of philosophe-sympathizers at the Sorbonne, as he has
sometimes been characterized,60 Prades was in fact an exponent of the
‘‘Jesuit synthesis’’: mainstream Jesuit apologetic arguments, based on a
synthesis of ideas drawn from Locke and Malebranche and familiar at
the Sorbonne at least since the early 1730s. In line with this mainstream
apologetical system, Prades argued (among other things) that the need for
revelation, faith, and the Church followed necessarily from fallen man’s
enslavement to sense perception and from the weakness of human reason,
and that historical criticism could vindicate the divine origins of the Penta-
teuch and shield biblically attested miracles from deistic critiques.61 The
dissertation therefore should have been unobjectionable, and in fact it ini-
tially escaped censure.62 But the faculty later reversed itself, Burson ex-
plains, for a complex set of reasons. These included, especially importantly,
the faculty’s desire to protect its own corporate privileges (essentially its
prerogative of censorship over its own members) from the threat of usurpa-
tion by the Paris Parlement, which was dominated by Jansenists hostile to
the Jesuits and bent on retaliation for their own expulsion from the Sor-
bonne in 1729.63 The clandestine circulation of Spinozistic and deistic
manuscripts had been increasing, and philosophes such as Diderot and
D’Alembert had been growing more radical in their materialism, for which
they acknowledged a Lockean basis.64 Prades’s thesis, based on the Locke-
inspired Jesuit synthesis and bearing some resemblance to materials in the
Encyclope´die, gave the Jansenists the opening they had been seeking. In
their ensuing propaganda campaign against the Sorbonne faculty, whom
they accused of conspiring with the philosophes and of being unfit to police
the orthodoxy of their students, the attention they drew to the philosophes’
materialist interpretation of Locke made him radioactive. Cowed, the Sor-
bonne faculty decided to flee the radiation instead of abating it. They cen-
sored Prades’s thesis in order to keep the Parlement from doing it for them,
60 Including in Thomas O’Connor, An Irish Theologian in Enlightenment France: Luke
Joseph Hooke (1714–96) (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995).
61 Burson, Rise and Fall, e.g. 64–76, 139–40, 208, 228.
62 Ibid., 240–41.
63 Ibid., 79, 108–13.
64 Ibid., 56–63, 156–58.
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in effect repudiating their own apologetical system and rendering it anath-
ema. Ultimately, this maneuver failed: by the mid-1750s the Sorbonne’s
censors were enforcing a Jansenist-like orthodoxy, and the Jesuits, tainted
by association with Locke despite their best efforts at self-repudiation, were
expelled in 1762–64.65 The tragedy, in Burson’s view, is that the Jesuits’
unforced error completed the process of intellectual polarization that left
eighteenth-century France with separate and bitterly opposed radical and
counter-Enlightenments, and relegated religion to the intellectually mori-
bund counter-Enlightenment, from which it now deserves to be rescued.66
If Sorkin’s religious Enlightenment is distinguished by qualities such as
reasonableness and toleration, which make it a potentially worthy object
of study for modern advocates of religious pluralism, and if Burson’s ex-
ample of theological Enlightenment is distinguished particularly by the so-
phistication of its Locke-inspired apologetics, what marks the religious
Enlightenment presented by Ulrich Lehner in Enlightened Monks is worldli-
ness and openness to intellectual and cultural innovation, reminiscent of
the 1962–65 Second Vatican Council. That, Lehner suggests, is where the
kind of theology evident among the subjects of his book, eighteenth-century
German and Austrian Benedictine monks, fully resurfaced after their mon-
asteries were dissolved in 1806.67 These monks, contrary to the popular
stereotype that Lehner criticizes, did not cling to old traditions as the world
changed around them. Faced with the ‘‘challenges’’ posed by the new ideas
and modes of life presented by Lehner as characteristic of the Enlighten-
ment, many monks showed themselves receptive and eager to adapt.
Lehner identifies eight occasionally overlapping categories of Enlight-
enment challenge and describes, chapter by chapter, how Benedictine
monks adapted to each.68 (1) Impressed by the methods of historical schol-
arship developed by the French Maurists in the seventeenth century and
promulgated in Germany in the early eighteenth, German Benedictines fol-
lowed the Maurist example and over several decades developed a new ‘‘his-
torical consciousness’’ and a commitment to producing works of historical
scholarship.69 (2) Tempted by the allure of worldly pastimes, monks dis-
carded many of their old ascetic ways and embraced the new: coffee, snuff,
secular theater, dancing, gaming and gambling, fashionable clothes, and
65 Ibid., 276, 282–84, 289–91.
66 Ibid., e.g. 299–300, 307–9.
67 Lehner, Enlightened Monks, 225.
68 What follows is of course a highly selective and simplified summary.
69 Lehner, Enlightened Monks, 226, 11–26.
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more. Silence and time for prayer diminished, while leisure time, meat con-
sumption, and resistance to the tonsure increased.70 (3) Inspired by new
ideas of liberty and rights, monks increasingly challenged the authority of
their abbots, and some ultimately looked to revolutionary France for libera-
tion from monastic tyranny.71 (4) Surrounded by learned networks of
communication and a developing public sphere, monks participated, con-
tributing scientific research and other scholarship of their own.72 (5) Gen-
eral trends in prison reform made themselves evident in monastic prisons,
too, as melancholy and otherwise discontented monks came increasingly
to be treated with mercy.73 (6) Faced with new legal theories, particularly
natural-law-based arguments for subjecting the church to state control, a
‘‘critical number’’ of monks embraced natural law theory, and monasteries
increasingly subordinated themselves to the jurisdiction of bishops.74
Finally, in response to the new science and to philosophical innovations by
Leibniz, Locke, Wolff, and Kant, Benedictine centers of learning—primarily
the University of Salzburg—modified their curricula as major Benedictine
philosophers and theologians took steps to ‘‘modernize’’ Catholic (7) phi-
losophy and (8) theology.75
As this list of challenges and responses suggests, Lehner’s enlightened
monks represent a particularly capacious religious Enlightenment, marked
by a more eclectic set of noteworthy characteristics than Sorkin’s or Bur-
son’s. Lehner’s shares with theirs an investment in historical scholarship,
an enthusiastic involvement in the international scholarly community, and
a respect for major eighteenth-century philosophers such as Locke and
Wolff. But it is somewhat lighter than Sorkin’s on religious toleration, and
it is heavier than both on prison reform and on general enthusiasm about
the material boons of commercial society. What unites this eclectic collec-
tion of elements, and what constitutes the essence of Enlightenment in
Lehner’s account, is newness and modernity, and Lehner takes pains to
suggest that the Benedictines’ embrace of this modernity was to their credit.
Their scientific and theological scholarship, for example, was ‘‘remarkable’’
and ‘‘groundbreaking,’’ their interlibrary loan system ‘‘sophisticated,’’ and
their achievements ‘‘great’’ (as in the case of the ‘‘undeservedly forgotten’’
Scottish Benedictine Andrew Gordon).76 Nor, in Lehner’s view, did the Ben-
edictines’ embrace of modernity mean a departure from their order’s or
70 Ibid., 27–53, 100–102.
71 Ibid., 226, 54–79.
72 Ibid., 226, 80–102.
73 Ibid., 103–20, 226.
74 Ibid., 226, 155–74.
75 Ibid., 227, 175–225.
76 Ibid., 85, 101, 191, 227.
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Catholicism’s fundamental ideals. Lehner does note the weakening of disci-
pline and the diminishing emphasis on asceticism and prayer, and he con-
cedes that the ‘‘growth in personal individualism’’ among monks could be
dangerous within religious communities. But he rejects the conventional
view that the second half of the eighteenth century witnessed a ‘‘crisis of
vocations’’ or that religious life was in decline,77 and he suggests that those
Benedictines who decided to abandon ‘‘outdated patterns of behavior’’
were choosing to preserve ‘‘the essential core of their vocational life.’’78
The extent to which the Benedictine order as a whole can be said to
belong to a religious Enlightenment is a question whose answer Lehner
must leave tantalizingly ambiguous. Given the nature of the available
sources, even the extensive research on which Lehner’s book is based can-
not produce numbers that would support a statistical survey of how many
Benedictines could be classified as ‘‘Enlighteners.’’ Much of the evidentiary
burden of the book’s argument is borne by the many anecdotes and individ-
ual biographical portraits that enliven the more general narrative. These
present a mixed picture. Some of the most gripping anecdotes concern
monks led by discontent to desert their monasteries, violate the rules,
become involved in serious controversy, or even abandon Catholicism.79
Some embraced radicalism of one kind or another, while others did not.80
The Enlighteners were clearly in many respects a motley group, whose
members did not welcome all innovations equally, and whose embrace of
some innovations often led to their marginalization. As for their relative
numbers and importance among the Benedictines as a whole, Lehner notes
that the order also contained outspoken opponents of change.81 And, he
points out, even if we can assume that many monks silently sympathized
with the more outspoken advocates of Enlightenment, we can also assume
that the reason for their silence was knowledge that the authorities’ sympa-
thies lay elsewhere.82
In defending the modernity of some kind of eighteenth-century reli-
gion, all three of these books illustrate the value of such a defense even for
those who may consider the question of religion’s modernity uninteresting,
overly general, or otherwise badly posed. Pursuing that question, as these
books attest, has begun to correct a long-standing, institutionally reinforced
77 Ibid., 27.
78 Ibid., 226.
79 Ibid., e.g. 123–44, 183–87, 207–12.
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defect in the study of eighteenth-century European intellectual history, by
showing that intellectual historians cannot understand most eighteenth-
century ideas and arguments without knowledge of eighteenth-century the-
ology and theological controversies, and that they therefore have a great
deal to learn from theologians and historians of religion. In light of the
Enlightenment’s putative anti-religiosity, it has long been easy for historians
to consider this kind of knowledge largely superfluous and its acquisition
not urgent.83 But it is clearly becoming more and more common to recog-
nize that eighteenth-century authors, including those conventionally con-
sidered participants in the Enlightenment, either had formal theological
training or were at least embedded in an intellectual culture in which theo-
logical issues were important subjects of discussion—and consequently that
historians must know something about theology in order to understand
what these people were writing about.
This growing recognition has had at least two important effects. One
effect has been the growth of mainstream scholarly interest in eighteenth-
century theologians who were important in their own time but until
recently had been attended to only by specialists or church historians.84
This effect is illustrated by the burgeoning field of Catholic Enlightenment
studies, advanced in the English-speaking world in the last three years not
only by Burson’s and Lehner’s books, but also by Michael Printy’s recovery
and reconstruction of eighteenth-century German Catholic ecclesiological-
political debates, and by various briefer forays into other national con-
texts.85 A second effect has been to motivate reinvestigations of obviously
important texts, people, and events whose significance once seemed clear
but often turns out to have been misunderstood. Burson’s reinterpretation
of the Prades Affair, of course, is one recent example of such a reinvestiga-
tion. A less recent example, worth recounting because of its big impact, is
the reinvestigation of David Hume’s failed bid for the professorship of
moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh in 1744–45. Long taken
as a classic case of the enlightened heretic victimized by benighted church
authorities—in this particular case, by those Presbyterian ministers who
instigated opposition to Hume and by those who vetoed his candidacy—the
story began to look different in the early 1990s to a group of scholars,
83 On the widespread mental barriers to the study of religious texts, cf. Breuer, ‘‘Einlei-
tung,’’ xiii.
84 On the ghettoization and self-ghettoization of religious history, cf. Gregory, ‘‘Trans-
forming ‘the Age of Reason,’ ’’ 293–94.
85 Printy, Enlightenment and the Creation of German Catholicism; and Printy and Lehner,
eds., Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe.
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including M. A. Stewart and James Moore, attuned to the fact that not all
Presbyterian ministers were the same. They sought and found new sources,
and on the basis of those sources they established that Hume had been
rejected not simply because of his alleged atheism, but rather because he
disagreed with Francis Hutcheson, among the other Presbyterian ministers
and professors who agitated against him, about whether justice was funda-
mentally a self-interested or an altruistic virtue.86 In other words, the clash
was not between religion and Enlightenment. Among its other ramifica-
tions, this reinterpretation called into question one of the longest-standing
and most influential organizing principles of the history of British moral
philosophy, which divided moral theorists into rationalists and sentimental-
ists according to whether they considered moral judgment more a matter
of reason or of sentiment. By showing that Hume and Hutcheson, both
sentimentalists, had in fact had a big quarrel about a separate issue, Stewart
and Moore revealed that the rationalist-sentimentalist classification some-
times does no justice to eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers’ own con-
scious concerns.87 This reinvestigation is one of the pivotal events in
Scottish Enlightenment research of the last thirty years.
Still another example is Thomas Ahnert’s reinvestigation of Christian
Thomasius (1655–1738), professor of law and philosophy at Halle in the
early eighteenth century and the subject of Ahnert’s Religion and the Ori-
gins of the German Enlightenment. Thomasius’s preeminence among the
founding luminaries of the German Enlightenment is a commonplace, and
86 The results of this research can be found primarily in M. A. Stewart, The Kirk and the
Infidel: An Inaugural Lecture delivered at Lancaster University on 9 November 1994
(1994; repr., Lancaster: Lancaster University Press, 2001); James Moore, ‘‘Hume and
Hutcheson,’’ in Hume and Hume’s Connexions, ed. M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 23–57; James Moore, ‘‘A Scots-Irish
Bookseller in Holland: William Smith of Amsterdam (1698–1741),’’ Eighteenth-Century
Scotland 7 (1993): 8–11; James Moore and M. A. Stewart, ‘‘William Smith and the Dis-
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at least in the German-speaking world he has long been a subject of schol-
arly attention. In recent years, a prevailing tendency has been to identify
him primarily as a major figure in the longer history of German or Euro-
pean natural law theory, and to characterize him as jurisprudential architect
of the post-Westphalian ‘‘de-confessionalized’’ state and progenitor of a
secular liberalism happily lacking the vulnerabilities of Kantian deontol-
ogy.88 He is often taken to have advocated insulating philosophy from reli-
gious questions; and accordingly, the ideas, references, and texts of his that
happen to seem particularly religious have been explained away as marginal
to his central project.89 These ideas, references, and texts are Ahnert’s start-
ing point. The result is a systematic reconstruction of Thomasius’s thought
that places the religious ideas close to the center of the system and makes
the interpretation of Thomasius as a champion of secularism appear hard
to sustain.
The overlooked ‘‘religious ideas’’ recovered by Ahnert are primarily
Thomasius’s theory of salvation and the theories of human psychological
anatomy that informed it. By way of reconstructing Thomasius’s early- and
mid-career quarrels with orthodox Lutheran and Pietist colleagues in Leip-
zig and Halle, all set against the backdrop of the rise of devotional piety in
the seventeenth century, Ahnert lays out Thomasius’s ‘‘heterodox’’ view
that salvation is unaided by the exercise of the intellect and does not depend
in any way on assent to theoretical doctrine. Salvation in fact requires the
development of what Thomasius calls ‘‘reasonable love’’ [amor rationalis]:
a longing for God that follows a lengthy process of moral regeneration
completed by divine intervention, such that the three natural passions of
avarice, ambition, and lust are either reined in by the supernatural ‘‘divine
spark’’ present in every human being (Thomasius’s earlier view), or are
brought into balance with one another (Thomasius’s later view). The Bible
is a helpful guide to this process of moral regeneration, but it is not a reposi-
tory of doctrinal opinion—which is irrelevant to the process anyway.90
Those who, like the orthodox Lutherans, insisted that the Bible was in fact
such a repository, that it required philosophically sophisticated exegesis in
order to be understood, and that understanding and intellectually assenting
88 E.g. Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early
Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and The Secularisa-
tion of the Confessional State: The Political Thought of Christian Thomasius (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
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to its teachings was essential to salvation, Thomasius accused of scholasti-
cism. A scholastic insistence on the necessity of assent to doctrine, Thomas-
ius charged, was nothing more than a pretext for the ‘‘papalist’’ clergy to
secure illegitimate secular power for themselves by, among other means,
providing the Bible with philosophical glosses legitimating that power.91
These accusations of scholasticism and anti-papalism, together with
the theory of salvation underlying them, are in Ahnert’s account a Leitmo-
tiv running through Thomasius’s thought, and they in fact provide the basis
for many of the apparently secular ideas that compose his putatively
‘‘enlightened reform program.’’92 Thomasius’s championing of a prince’s
right to intervene in church affairs, for example, is not quite the secularizing
political philosophy it may appear to be. Thomasius in fact derives the right
primarily from the prince’s duty to promote godliness in his territory, and
from the presupposition that doctrine, as well as most church ceremony, is
irrelevant to salvation and is therefore not the exclusive domain of
Brandenburg-Prussia’s ‘‘papalist’’ Lutheran clergy.93 The same theory of
salvation and the ‘‘anti-papalism’’ based on it, Ahnert explains, inform
Thomasius’s extensive writings on church history and Roman law.94 They
are also buttressed by hermetic- and mystical-looking writings on natural
philosophy, in which Thomasius describes matter as imbued with spiritual
beings unknowable by human reason.95 Even the natural law theories for
which Thomasius is best known reflect these ideas. According to Ahnert,
Thomasius’s oft-puzzled-over evolution, from a defender of Pufendorf’s
divine-command conception of moral obligation into an exponent of a very
different conception, based on analysis of the human passions and a denial
of the will’s freedom, was not a response merely to debates about volunta-
rism and essentialism now familiar in the historiography of natural law
theory96; it also reflected changes in the theory of psychological anatomy
with which Thomasius supported his theory of salvation.97
Among the many implications of this new portrait of Thomasius are
two important reminders in the ongoing search for viable definitions of
Enlightenment and religious Enlightenment. First, if Thomasius is a quint-
essential early German Enlightenment figure, and if religion can be taken to
91 Ibid., e.g. 40–2, 73–80, 88–89.
92 Ibid., 4–5 et passim.
93 Ibid., 44–56.
94 Ibid., 59–68, 73–80.
95 Ibid., 107–19.
96 As presented, notably, in Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy.
97 Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment, 94–101.
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refer to ideas about salvation, then we must acknowledge the ‘‘deeply reli-
gious preoccupations at the heart of the early German Enlightenment’’ and,
by extension, at the heart of the apparently secular reform programs it gen-
erated.98 Second, if by the same token Thomasius’s religion can be consid-
ered an example of religious Enlightenment, then we must acknowledge
that rationality, so important to Sorkin’s description of religious Enlighten-
ment but disparaged by Thomasius, was in fact a ‘‘contested notion’’ and
is not an uncomplicatedly viable component in religious Enlightenment’s
definition.99 All these ifs are hardly trivial, of course, and in response Sorkin
might well abide by his own definition as stipulated and happily exclude
Thomasius from the religious Enlightenment. He would thereby convert
the matter into a frustrating and familiar kind of definitional quarrel. But
no less important a lesson to draw from Ahnert’s book—as from Sorkin’s,
Burson’s, and Lehner’s—is how obviously our understanding of the histori-
cal record can benefit from debate about religion and Enlightenment, what-
ever that debate’s terminological ambiguities and other defects.100 If the
debate continues to restore knowledge of theology to intellectual historians’
standard repertoire and to open the lines of communication between intel-
lectual historians and theologians, then its persistence should be a cause for
celebration rather than despair.101
Wellesley College.
98 Ibid., 126.
99 Ibid., 122. Cf. Carl Hinrichs, Preußentum und Pietismus: Der Pietismus in
Brandenburg-Preußen als religio¨s-soziale Reformbewegung (Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1971), 352–53, 362–63.
100 Cf. Sheehan, ‘‘Enlightenment,’’ 1064, 1075.
101 For encouragement and for helpful comments on drafts of this essay, I thank Nathan
Arrington, David Bell, Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Alexander Bevilacqua, Eliah Bures, Michael
Carhart, Ulrich Diehl, Dirk Effertz, Anthony Grafton, Gordon Graham, Martin Jay, Russ
Leo, Steven O. Lestition, Jonathan Sheehan, and Johan van der Zande.
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